

Message Text

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ACTION A-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6603

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 541

FOR A ONLY DISTRIBUTION; ATTENTION HOWE

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH REORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 0149

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE ONE-HOUR BRIEF-
ING OF CODEL SMITH BY THE CHARGE AND MEMBERS OF THE
EMBASSY STAFF ON JANUARY 6, 1978. EXCEPT FOR BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 2), ALL
COMMENTS WERE IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS BY
THE CODEL.

2. U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS:

A. RELATIONS HAVE EXPERIENCED UPS AND DOWNS IN
RECENT YEARS, BUT IN GENERAL REMAIN GREATLY IMPROVED
AS COMPARED WITH THE SIXTIES. FOLLOWING A STEADY
IMPROVEMENT IN THE 1972-74 PERIOD (MARKED BY FOUR
SUMMIT MEETINGS), MOMENTUM SLOWED DURING 1975 AND
1976 AND THERE WERE SETBACKS AS THE RESULT OF ANGOLA,
THE SOVIET REJECTION OF THE 1974 TRADE ACT
PROVISIONS, SOVIET FRUSTRATION OVER MIDDLE EAST
DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE DELAY IN CONCLUDING A SALT-II
TREATY. THE ATMOSPHERE FURTHER SUFFERED IN THE
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SPRING OF 1977 WHEN THE SOVIETS REJECTED OUR SALT
PROPOSALS AND REACTED TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES. THERE WAS A DECIDED IMPROVE-
MENT, HOWEVER, IN OCTOBER 1977 FOLLOWING GROMYKO'S
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WHICH ACHIEVED MAJOR
PROGRESS ON SALT, AND THE US-SOVIET JOINT DECLARA-
TION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

B. IT IS CLEAR THAT SALT IS THE KEY ISSUE IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS: WHEN PROGRESS IS MADE IN THIS AREA, THE ATMOSPHERE GENERALLY IMPROVES REGARDING OTHER ISSUES. THIS, OF COURSE, IS NO ARGUMENT FOR MAKING CONCESSIONS IN SALT FOR THE SAKE OF ATMOSPHERE, BUT WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT OUR ABILITY OR INABILITY TO ACHIEVE A SOUND SALT-II TREATY WILL INEVITABLY AFFECT OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. IN OUR OPINION, THE ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES HAVE NOT MADE THE SOVIETS MORE RELUCTANT TO REACH A SALT AGREEMENT; THEY APPROACH SALT STRICTLY ON ITS OWN TERMS.

3. KNOWLEDGE OF SALT ISSUES BY SOVIET PUBLIC: WHILE THEY HAVE A GRASP OF THE ISSUES, OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS IN MOSCOW DO NOT ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE DETAILS; THEY ARE HANDLED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA. THE SOVIET PUBLIC AS A WHOLE IS NOT WELL INFORMED ON SALT ISSUES BUT THERE IS A STRONG, GENERALIZED INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT. THE YOUNGER GENERATION WHICH GREW UP AFTER WW II IS OF COURSE LESS KEENLY AWARE OF THE SUFFERING THE WAR BROUGHT THAN THE OLDER GENERATION, BUT THERE STILL IS A PERVASIVE YEARNING FOR PEACE AMONG THE SOVIET POPULATION, UNCLASSIFIED

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WHICH SUFFERED 20 MILLION CASULTIES DURING THE LAST WAR.

4. VERIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS:

WHILE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OFTEN STRESSES "TRUST" AS A KEY ELEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION. WHILE THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO THE MEANS OF VERIFICATION PROPOSED, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS.

5. EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY: SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS WELCOME AND STRONGLY SUPPORT OUR ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SEE NO REASON TO CHALLENGE THEIR JUDGMENT. THOUGH THE SOVIET OFFICIAL REACTION HAS BEEN VIGOROUS ON THE RHETORICAL AND PROPAGANDA PLANE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES HAVE IMPINGED IMPORTANTLY ON OTHER ISSUES.

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6. JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT:

THE GOAL OF THE AMENDMENT--BETTER OBSERVANCE OF
THE RIGHT OF EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION--IS
IMPORTANT AND LAUDABLE. IN OUR OPINION, HOWEVER,
EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN AN
EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE ITS GOAL.

7. MIDDLE EAST:

THE SOVIETS HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY SETBACKS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. RATHER THAN ADMIT IT, THEY REACT BY
FALSELY CHARGING US WITH HAVING CONNIVED WITH SADAT
IN PLANNING HIS INITIATIVE, WITH PUSHING A SEPARATE
BEGIN-SADAT DEAL, AND WITH TAKING THE ACTION OUT OF
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OCTOBER 1 US-SOVIET JOINT
STATEMENT WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON RECONVENING THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

8. SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES--GENERAL:

A. THE SOVIET GOVT RECOGNIZES "FAMILY REUNIFICATION"
AS THE PRIMARY BASIS FOR EMIGRATION. IN THE CASE OF
RECOGNIZED ETHNIC MINORITY NATIONALITIES IN THE USSR
SUCH AS THE JEWS AND GERMANS, THE AUTHORITIES ALSO
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IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE "RETURN TO THE HOMELAND" AS A BASIS. PERSONS APPLYING TO EMIGRATE MUST SUBMIT AN INVITATION (VYZOV) FROM THE FAMILY ABROAD TO WHICH THEY WISH TO BE REUNITED. IF THE SOVIET GOVT GRANTS EXIT PERMISSION, THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE ONLY IF HE HAS AN ENTRY VISA TO THE COUNTRY FROM WHICH HE RECEIVED THE VYZOV.

B. WE DO NOT HAVE RELIABLE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO APPLY OR WOULD LIKE TO APPLY FOR EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR. THERE IS A STRONG INTIMIDATING FACTOR AGAINST APPLYING, SINCE SANCTIONS USUALLY FOLLOW SOON AFTER APPLICATION FOR EMIGRATION IN THE FORM OF LOSS OF JOBS, APARTMENTS, AND TELEPHONES, AND PEER PRESSURE AGAINST CHILDREN. PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT GRANTED EXIT PERMISSION SOON AFTER THEY APPLY ARE FORCED TO MOVE IN WITH FRIENDS OR RELATIVES AND SEEK "ILLEGAL" PRIVATE WORK.

C. SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION:

SOVIET EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL HAS GONE UP TO ABOUT 17,000 IN 1977 AS COMPARED TO 13,000 IN 1976, A RISE OF ABOUT 15 PERCENT. JEWISH EMIGRATION TO THE US HAS FALLEN TO 493 IN 1977 FROM 650 IN 1976, A DROP OF ABOUT 24 PERCENT. THE GREAT DISPARITY IN THE FIGURES FOR SOVIET EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND THE US MAY BE EXPLAINED BY SOVIET POLICY PERMITTING ETHNIC JEWISH PERSONS TO "RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND: IN ISRAEL WHILE JEWS PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE USSR TO RESETTLE IN THE US ARE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH CLOSE RELATIVES IN THE US WHO SEND THEM VYZOVs.

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D. SOVIET EMIGRATION TO THE U.S.:

TOTAL SOVIET EMIGRATION TO THE US FELL BY ABOUT 20 PERCENT FROM 2,574 IN 1976 TO 2,047 IN 1977. OF THE LATTER, 1,370 WERE ARMENIANS, REPRESENTING ABOUT 68 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. THE NEXT LARGEST GROUP WERE 493 JEWS WHO REPRESENTED ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. THE REMAINING 7 PERCENT CAME FROM THE REMAINING POPULATION, WELL OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET TOTAL.

E. THE UPSURGE IN ARMENIAN EMIGRATION TO THE US BEGAN IN 1976 AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A RESULT OF THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON. MANY SOVIET ARMENIANS HAD RECEIVED EXIT PERMISSION TO REJOIN RELATIVES IN LEBANON, BUT WERE BLOCKED FROM TRAVELING TO THAT

COUNTRY WHEN THE LEBANESE GOVT CLOSED ITS BORDERS DURING THE CIVIL WAR. SINCE THE ARMENIANS CANNOT EASILY BE ASSIMILATED INTO SOVIET SOCIETY, THE SOVIET GOVT APPEARS TO HAVE FOLLOWED A LIBERAL POLICY IN PERMITTING THEM TO SWITCH THEIR RESETTLEMENT DESTINATION FROM LEBANON TO THE US.

9. LISTENING TO THE VOA AND TO FOREIGN RADIOS IN GENERAL:

A. BY SPINNING THE DIAL, THE SOVIET LISTENER HAS A VARIETY OF FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE, ALL UNJAMMED, INCLUDING THE VOA, BBC, CBC, RADIO STOCKHOLM, DEUTSCHE WELLE, AMONG OTHERS. THE MOST RECENT NEWS OF THE WORLD AND, AS REPORTED BY MEDIA SOURCES, OF SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IS BROADCAST INTO THE USSR, SOMETIMES WITHIN HOURS OF THE OCCURRENCE.

B. THE EFFECT OF THIS FACT OF MODERN SOVIET LIFE IS INCALCULABLE. CERTAINLY, WE KNOW THAT SOVIET MEDIA UNCLASSIFIED

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COVERAGE OF THE EVENTS DESCRIBED HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STORIES BEING BEAMED INTO THE SOVIET UNION--THUS THE SOVIETS ARE COMPELLED TO ADDRESS THE FACTS MORE SQUARELY.

C. AS FOR THE VOA LISTENERSHIP, REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE VOA AUDIENCE RECENTLY COMPLETED BY MIT PROFESSOR ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, OF WHICH THE STATE DEPT AND USIA HAVE COPIES. SINCE THE EMBASSY DOES NOT HAVE COPIES, WE GO ONLY BY HEARSAY OF HIS RESULTS IN DESCRIBING AN ESTIMATED VOA AUDIENCE OF "BETWEEN 10 AND 20 MILLION." WITH THE ANNUAL COST OF THE RUSSIAN SERVICE (AT \$3,700,000) AND CALCULATING "LISTENING" AS THREE TIMES A WEEK, WE HAVE AT A CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE A "PER-LISTENING COST" OF LESS THAN 1 CENT, WHICH WE SUGGESTED IS FULL VALUE FOR THE PENNY SPENT.

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D. ALTHOUGH WE HEAR OCCASIONALLY THAT THE VOA IS JAMMED, NEITHER WE NOR OUR TECHNICAL MONITORS HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF IT. RADIO LIBERTY IS HEAVILY JAMMED IN SOVIET CITIES, BUT CAN BE HEARD IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GUESS THE SIZE OF RADIO LIBERTY'S LISTENING AUDIENCE.

10. MICROWAVE RADIATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE EMBASSY:

THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BEAM NON-IONIZING MICRO-WAVE RADIATION AT THE UPPER FLOORS OF THE CHANCERY FROM TWO IDENTIFIABLE LOCATIONS NEAR THE EMBASSY. WE MONITOR THE RADIATION CONTINUOUSLY. WHEREAS AT ITS HIGH POINT THE RADIATION OCCASIONALLY REACHED 18 MICROWAVE PER SQUARE CENTIMETER DURING THE WINTER OF 1975-76, IT HAS NOW FALLEN TO A FRACTION OF ONE MICROWATT PER SQUARE CENTIMETER FOLLOWING OUR REPRESENTATION. FROM TIME TO TIME RECENTLY THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN SHORT PERIODS (NOT EXCEEDING ONE HOUR) WHEN THE RADIATION HAS INCREASED IN LEVEL TO BETWEEN TWO AND NINE MICROWATTS PER SQUARE CENTIMETER. ALL OF THESE MEASUREMENTS ARE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY'S SYSTEM OF SCREENS. INSIDE THE SCREENS, THAT IS INSIDE THE EMBASSY, THE LEVEL OF RADIATION IS BARELY DETECTABLE. THE EXACT PURPOSE OF THE RADIATION IS UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLEAR; IT COULD BE TO ACTIVATE LISTENING DEVICES AND/OR IT COULD BE TO INTERFERE WITH OUR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER ADMITTED THAT THEY ARE BEAMING MICROWAVES AGAINST US; RATHER THEY REFER TO GENERAL MICROWAVE EMISSIONS FROM INDUSTRIAL OR OTHER "ORDINARY" SOURCES IN THE CITY. INVESTIGATIONS THUS FAR HAVE DISCLOSED NO DAMAGE TO THE HEALTH OF EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, BUT WE CONTINUE TO MAKE REPRESENTA-

TIONS TO THE SOVIETS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RADIATION BEING BEAMED AGAINST OTHER PROPERTY OF THIS OR (AS FAR AS WE KNOW) AGAINST ANY OTHER EMBASSY.

11. THE AUGUST 26, 1977 EMBASSY FIRE:

A. BY DEDUCTION WE ASSUME THAT THE FIRE, WHICH BROKE OUT ON THE EIGHTH FLOOR OF THE CHANCERY, WAS CAUSED BY A FAULT IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OR WIRING ON THE 8TH FLOOR. SAMPLES OF BURNT MATERIAL ANALYZED IN WASHINGTON SHOWED ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF FOUL PLAY; IT WAS AN ACCIDENT PURE AND SIMPLE. THE FIRE HAZARD IN THE CHANCERY IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT IN THIS AREA OF MOSCOW THE ELECTRICAL CURRENT IS 127 VOLTS, WHICH SUITS NEITHER EUROPEAN NOR AMERICAN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT STANDARDS, THEREFORE WE MUST USE MANY TRANSFORMERS WHICH CAN OVERHEAT. WE HOPE THE PROBLEM WILL BE REMEDIED SHORTLY WHEN THE ELECTRICAL CURRENT SOURCE IN THIS PART OF MOSCOW IS CONVERTED TO 220 VOLTS.

B. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WAS COMPROMISED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL DURING THE FIRE. AT ONE POINT SOVIET FIREFIGHTERS DID ENTER THE UNCLASSIFIED

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C&R AREA, BUT THEY DID SO ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

12. FBO PROJECT SUPERVISOR, EUGENE BALLARD, GAVE A SHORT BRIEFING ON THE NEW EMBASSY COMPLEX USING DRAWINGS.

13. THE BRIEFING THEN ENDED AND THE CODEL WAS TAKEN ON A TOUR OF THE EMBASSY'S FACILITIES. MATLOCK

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